Your Business Just Got Scammed. Here’s What to Do in the First Hour

Editorial cover with the headline ‘Your business just got scammed’ over a 72-hour countdown ring and three stat blocks: $3.05B in BEC losses, $123K average hit, 58% RAT recovery rate

Bottom line up front

If your business just sent a wire or ACH payment to a fraudster, do four things in the next hour: call your bank’s fraud line (the number on your statement, never one from the email) and ask for a recall — a SWIFT recall if it went overseas; file at ic3.gov, whatever the amount; save every email, invoice and wire confirmation; and coordinate by phone, not from a mailbox the attacker may still be reading. Money sent abroad is most likely to be stopped when it’s reported within 72 hours. Hit by ransomware instead? Disconnect the affected machines from the network, and only power them off if you can’t.

The first phone call is always the same one. A controller, voice flat, asks the bank if the $187,000 wire that left at 3:12 — the one the CFO supposedly approved over text — can come back. By the time they’re asking, the answer is often no. Sometimes it’s yes, and the difference is usually how fast they asked.

The FBI’s 2025 IC3 report attributes $3.05 billion in losses to business email compromise alone last year across 24,768 complaints — roughly $123,000 per case — and in 86% of the BEC transactions victims reported, the money left by wire transfer or ACH. Only investment fraud cost victims more. BEC doesn’t need a sophisticated target; it does best at companies with thin AP teams, no formal callback policy, and a CEO who still approves invoices over email.

This is the playbook for the moment you realize it just happened to you.

72 hours The window that matters most for money sent abroad: FinCEN says it is most likely to stop or recover a fraudulent wire when it’s reported to law enforcement within 72 hours. At home, the FBI’s Recovery Asset Team froze $679 million of the $1.16 billion it went after in 2025 — a 58% success rate — and its advice is blunt: time is of the essence.
Sources: FinCEN Rapid Response Program fact sheet, April 2026; FBI IC3 2025 Annual Report.

The first 60 minutes — the wire is everything

If your incident involves money already moving (BEC, vendor-email compromise, payroll diversion, fake-invoice fraud), there is only one priority and it is not technical: get the wire stopped. Everything else — legal, communications, even forensics — runs second to that call.

  1. Call your bank’s fraud or wire desk. Not the branch, and not a number from the email thread. Use the number on your statement or the bank’s website, or your treasury banker’s direct line. Ask them to recall the payment — a SWIFT recall if the wire went overseas — and, as the FBI’s Recovery Asset Team advises, ask what hold-harmless or indemnity letter they need from you to send it.
  2. File at ic3.gov in parallel. Have a second person do it while the controller is on with the bank. The FBI’s guidance is to file “regardless of the amount lost” and to include the full transaction details: amount and currency, date, your bank and account, and the receiving bank, account name and number. IC3’s Recovery Asset Team uses those details to ask the receiving bank to freeze the account — a process the FBI calls the Financial Fraud Kill Chain. For wires that went abroad, a law-enforcement complaint is also what brings in FinCEN’s Rapid Response Program; FinCEN asks victims not to contact it directly.
  3. Call your cyber insurer’s breach hotline. Most cyber policies require notice of an incident “as soon as practicable,” and insurers routinely refuse to pay for costs you ran up before you told them, according to broker Lockton’s cyber claims guide. Call before you hire anyone.
  4. Preserve evidence before you touch the inbox. Do not delete the spoof email. Do not remove the attacker’s forwarding rules until you’ve exported them. Do not reset the compromised user’s password until the forensics path is captured. The CISA-FBI #StopRansomware Guide details what to grab; the short version: full mailbox export, sign-in logs, mailbox rule history, and an image of any affected endpoint.
  5. Go out of band. Assume the attacker can read the compromised mailbox. Coordinate by phone, don’t reply on the hijacked thread, and don’t email the team about the incident from the system they’re in. CISA’s guidance is the same for ransomware: use out-of-band communication, such as phone calls, so attackers don’t learn they’ve been detected.

One important nuance: the fraudulent request often doesn’t come from a spoofed address at all. When a real vendor’s mailbox has been taken over, it comes from a legitimate inbox, on a legitimate thread, with a legitimate signature block — the pattern we break down in our guide to vendor email compromise and bank-detail change fraud. The fix is procedural, not technical: call back to a number you already had on file before any payment change. If your only verification channel is the email thread the attacker is on, you have no verification.

When a payment email looks even slightly off, our free email scam checker can surface the sender tells and the pressure tactic before anyone acts on it — a fast gut-check to pair with the callback, not a replacement for it.

Figure 01 · The 72-hour incident response clock
FIG. 01 / INCIDENT RESPONSE / THE 72-HOUR CLOCKWho calls whom, and whenTHE CLOCK1Hour 0: containCall the bank for a recall, file at ic3.gov, call your cyber insurer, andsave the email.2Hour 4: investigateSign-in logs, mailbox and forwarding rules, other mailboxes, andwhat data was exposed.3Hour 24: notifyCounsel works out who has to be told, and by when: customers, thestate, regulators.WHO ELSE TO TELL, BY SITUATIONMoney movedBank → ic3.gov → insurerData exposedCounsel → state AG → customersSystems encryptedCISA → FBI field office → IR firmPublic companySEC Form 8-K within 4 businessdays of finding it materialHealthcare entityHIPAA breach notice; report to HHSDefense contractorDFARS: tell DoD within 72 hoursThe first hour decides whether the money comes back. The next 71 decidewhat it costs.

Sources: FBI IC3 2025 Annual Report; CISA #StopRansomware Guide; SEC Form 8-K Item 1.05; HHS breach notification rule; DFARS 252.204-7012.

Who do you call first after a business scam?

In this order. The first four are for the first hour; the rest are for the same day. Each call either stops the money or protects your ability to get it back, and if you have two people, split the first two calls between them.

  1. Your bank’s fraud department. On a number you trust: the one on your statement or the bank’s website. Ask for a recall of the payment, a case number, and a direct contact who will tell you what the receiving bank says. Don’t take “it’s already gone” from the first person you reach; ask whether a recall request has actually been sent.
  2. The FBI, through ic3.gov. File even if the bank thinks the money is gone. In one case in the FBI’s 2025 report, a couple’s $449,000 closing wire was still sitting in the receiving account when IC3 asked that bank to freeze it — after the couple’s own attorneys had tried the bank and gotten nowhere. Keep the complaint number; your bank and your insurer will ask for it.
  3. Your cyber insurer’s breach hotline — before you hire anyone. Many policies require the insurer’s consent before you engage lawyers or forensic firms, and an insurer that didn’t agree to an off-panel vendor may not reimburse it at all, Lockton’s guide warns. Ask, too, whether the policy covers social-engineering fraud at all: not every carrier offers it, and where it’s offered the limit can be lower than the rest of the policy, brokers at Amwins note.
  4. The company whose identity was used. If the attacker posed as your vendor, customer or landlord, call them on a number you already had. Their mailbox may be the compromised one, and their other customers may be getting the same “new bank details” email today. The FTC’s breach-response guide makes the same point about other businesses whose accounts or data were caught up in yours.
  5. Your local FBI field office. IC3 is the front door, but the FBI has long told BEC victims they can also report to their local field office, and CISA’s ransomware checklist lists the field office alongside IC3 and CISA itself. If ransomware is involved or the attacker may still be inside your systems, make that call today.
  6. An attorney, or the breach coach the carrier assigns. Usually a privacy lawyer. They decide who you’re legally required to tell, in what order and by when, and they should see anything you put in writing to customers before it goes out.
  7. Your state attorney general and other regulators — if personal data was exposed. A diverted payment on its own isn’t a data breach. A compromised mailbox full of customer or employee records can be. Every state has a breach-notification law, and 36 states require a report to the attorney general or another state agency, according to a 2026 survey by the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse. Counsel runs that clock; the details are in the 72-hour section below.
Figure 02 · The first hour: who to call
FIG. 02 / BUSINESS SCAM / WHO TO CALLThe first hour: who to call, in orderIN THE FIRST HOURYour bank’s fraud lineUse the number on your statement. Ask for a recall.File at ic3.govWhatever the amount. Include the full payment details.Your cyber insurer’s breach hotlineBefore you hire a single vendor on your own.The company whose name was usedOn a number you already had. Their email may be hijacked.THE SAME DAYYour local FBI field officeReport there too, especially for ransomware.A lawyer, or your insurer’s breach coachThey decide who must be told what, and by when.Regulators and your state attorney generalOnly if personal data was exposed. Counsel runs that clock.Don’t coordinate from the hacked inboxAssume the attacker is reading it. Pick up the phone.The money first, then the people who can freeze it.1234567

Sources: FBI IC3 2025 Annual Report and Recovery Asset Team guidance; FinCEN Rapid Response Program fact sheet, April 2026; CISA ransomware checklist; Lockton cyber claims guide. Blue marks your move, red the attacker’s.

One call to refuse: anyone who contacts you offering to get the money back for a fee. Criminals follow fraud victims with fake “asset recovery” services and even fake FBI agents; the real IC3 doesn’t reach out to recover funds, as we explain in our piece on the fake FBI/IC3 recovery scam.

Copy-ready messages: your bank, the vendor, your staff

Make the calls first. Then put each one in writing, from an account you know is clean, so there’s a timestamped record. Fill in the brackets and cut anything that doesn’t apply.

To your bank (after the phone call)

Subject: Fraudulent [wire / ACH] — recall request — [Company], account ending [1234]

Following my call with [name] at [time], we are reporting a fraudulent payment and request an immediate recall.

  • Amount and currency: [ ]
  • Date and time sent: [ ]
  • Sent from: [account name], ending [1234]
  • Sent to: [beneficiary name], [receiving bank], account [number], [country]
  • Reference numbers from the wire confirmation: [ ]
  • IC3 complaint number: [ ]

We sent this payment on fraudulent instructions impersonating [our vendor / our CEO]. Please confirm the recall has been sent to the receiving bank, tell us what indemnification documents you need from us, and give us a case number and a direct contact. Our contact for this incident is [name, mobile].

To the vendor or customer whose name was used

Subject: Payment instructions sent in your name — please call us

On [date] we received an email from [address] asking us to [send invoice [#] to a new account / update your bank details]. We now believe it was fraudulent and have reported it to our bank and the FBI. It may mean your email account has been compromised, or that someone is imitating your domain. Until we’ve spoken by phone on [number on file], we won’t act on any payment instructions that arrive by email. Your other customers may have received the same message.

Call first. Send this only to an address you’ve confirmed on that call — never as a reply to the fraudulent thread.

To your staff (by text, phone or a channel you know is clean)

Subject: Fraud incident — read before you approve any payment

We’re dealing with a fraud involving [our email / a vendor’s email]. Until you hear otherwise from [name]:

  • No payment, vendor bank-detail change or payroll change goes through without a phone call to a number already on file.
  • Don’t reply to, forward or delete any email about [vendor / invoice]. Send anything related to [name].
  • Don’t discuss this by email. Use [phone bridge / channel].
  • If anyone calls offering to help recover the money, take their details and send them to [name].

The first 24 hours — scope it before you announce it

By hour four, you should know whether this is a one-account BEC or something deeper. The small indicators are usually the tells: a new mailbox forwarding rule pushing payment mail to RSS-Feeds or Conversation-History, a sign-in from a country your CFO has never been to, an MFA bypass via a stolen session cookie. Capture all of it. If you have managed IT or an MSSP, they get the call now; if you don’t, this is the moment to engage IR — through your cyber-insurance panel, since a firm the carrier didn’t approve may not be covered.

If the breach extends beyond an inbox — ransomware, data exfiltration, customer database access — follow CISA’s I’ve Been Hit by Ransomware checklist: isolate (disconnect, don’t shut down), preserve evidence, identify the variant if possible, and report to CISA and your local FBI field office.

Common first-day mistakes that make recovery worse

  • Wiping the compromised mailbox before forensics. The mailbox rules are the evidence. Resetting first destroys the trail.
  • Emailing the team about the incident — on the system the attacker still has access to. Use phones, Signal, or an out-of-band channel.
  • Paying the “corrected” invoice. The attacker often emails again, mid-incident, with a new account number labeled as a fix. It’s the same scammer.
  • Calling the IT vendor before the bank. Money has a clock; logs don’t.

What to do if a business email account was hacked

If the fake payment request came from inside your own email system, or the attacker clearly knew what was in your threads, treat the mailbox as compromised. The order matters here: capture what the attacker set up, then cut off their access, then clean up. Doing it the other way round deletes your evidence and can leave them a way back in.

Microsoft 365

  1. Capture the inbox rules and forwarding first. Microsoft’s own checklist for a compromised mailbox flags rules that forward mail to unknown addresses, rules that move messages into the Notes, Junk Email or RSS Subscriptions folders, and recently added external forwarding. An admin can list every rule, including hidden ones, with Get-InboxRule -IncludeHidden, and mailbox-level forwarding with Get-Mailbox. Screenshot or export the output before anything is deleted.
  2. Disable the account, then revoke its sessions. Microsoft recommends disabling the account while you investigate, then revoking all active sign-in sessions and refresh tokens (Revoke-MgUserSignInSession). A password reset on its own doesn’t end a session the attacker already has, and app passwords aren’t revoked when you reset the password.
  3. Check MFA methods and app consents. Remove any authentication method or device the user doesn’t recognize, and any app they didn’t knowingly grant access to the mailbox. Consent and token tricks are how attackers keep access through a password change; our explainer on device-code phishing in Microsoft 365 shows one way it happens.
  4. Then clean up and restore. Remove the malicious rules and forwarding, check the user hasn’t been given admin roles, reset the password, and re-enable the account with MFA enforced.

For the full Microsoft 365 eviction sequence, including rogue devices and vendor app credentials, see why a password reset isn’t enough.

If the account was lost on a fake enrollment page during a phone call, see the passkey migration scam for what else to check, including deleted security emails and apps outside single sign-on.

Google Workspace

Google’s compromised-account checklist starts with suspending the user, which also resets their sign-in cookies and OAuth tokens. From there: review the user’s sign-in events in the Admin console, reset the password, revoke OAuth tokens and app passwords, and go through the user’s Gmail filters and forwarding settings with them before you unsuspend the account. Google recommends 2-Step Verification with security keys afterwards.

Then look sideways

Check the same rules and forwarding on the mailboxes attackers like best — accounts payable, payroll and the executives whose names go on payment requests — and read the compromised account’s Sent Items for messages it sent to your customers and vendors. If the attacker sent invoices from your domain, the people who received them need a phone call too.

If an IR firm is already on the case

Let them sequence this. Some firms want a log export or a mailbox image before the account is touched, and the what not to do list in the next section still applies: isolate the account, but don’t wipe it.

Forensic preservation: what to grab before you touch anything

The most expensive IR mistake is destroying evidence by trying to clean it up before it’s been captured. Most SMBs have no in-house forensics capability — that’s fine. What matters is what you do (and don’t do) between discovery and the moment a DFIR firm picks up the case. They’ll need a clean record of three things: who got in, what they touched, what left the building. Every step before they arrive either helps or destroys that record.

Capture this, immediately, before any “cleanup”

What not to do in the forensic window

  • Do not reimage, reinstall, or factory-reset the affected machine. That destroys the timeline and frequently ends the investigation before it starts.
  • Do not reset the compromised user’s password without coordinating with DFIR. Yes, it’s counterintuitive. The reset can invalidate session tokens forensics still needs and tip the attacker that the response is underway. Isolate the account first (disable, revoke tokens) and reset only when the IR lead says so.
  • Do not run a full-environment AV sweep. Most consumer AV products quarantine and modify file timestamps, which mangles the timeline. Targeted EDR queries, yes; broad scans, not yet.
  • Do not communicate over the compromised channel. Assume the attacker is reading internal email and Slack right now. Move incident traffic to a phone bridge, an external Signal group, or a separate, fresh Microsoft tenant.
  • Do not delete the malicious email. Mark it, save the source file, leave the message in place until DFIR pulls it.

If you have cyber insurance, the policy probably names a panel of pre-approved DFIR firms; hiring someone off-panel without the carrier’s consent can leave that bill uncovered. The two calls that matter in hour two are your broker and the breach coach the carrier assigns — usually a privacy attorney who conducts everything that comes next.

The new extortion: double, triple, and pure

The ransomware story most operators carry — files get encrypted, you pay for a decryption key — is about two years out of date. Modern crews monetize the same intrusion in two or three layers, and a backups-only defense no longer covers the threat.

Double extortion — encrypt and leak — has been common for years and is now the norm: incident-response firm Coveware found data theft in 74% of the cases it worked in the second quarter of 2025. Attackers exfiltrate data days or weeks before launching the encryptor, then threaten to publish on a leak site if you don’t pay. Restoring from backups solves the encryption half and does nothing about the leak.

Triple extortion — encrypt, leak, harass — adds a third lever. Some crews email or call your customers, patients, or employees directly with their own data, demanding they pressure you to pay. Those calls can start within hours, and the social fallout outruns any plan that wasn’t pre-written.

Pure extortion — no encryption at all — is the newest and hardest model to detect. ShinyHunters, the crew behind the May 2026 Canvas breach of 8,809 institutions, built an economy on vishing into SaaS instances (Snowflake, Salesforce, support tools), exfiltrating, and threatening publication. No malware to detect, no decryptor to debate — just a phone call and a deadline.

74% of the ransomware and extortion cases Coveware handled in Q2 2025 involved data exfiltration, in addition to (or instead of) encryption. The data is the leverage now, not the encryption key — and a backups-only defense no longer covers the threat.
Source: Coveware by Veeam, Q2 2025 quarterly ransomware report.

How to handle an extortion demand

The single best decision in the first hour of an extortion event is not made by IT. It’s made by the executive who agrees, before anything else, that outside counsel and (if covered) the breach coach will lead all communications.

Paying does not close the incident; it changes which kind of incident it is. You’re relying on a criminal’s promise to delete data they’ve already copied, and, as the FBI puts it, paying a ransom doesn’t guarantee you’ll get any data back.

Once the bleeding has stopped, the notification obligations begin. The rules are not optional and the deadlines are real.

State breach notification. All 50 states have data breach notification laws, and they don’t agree on the deadline. According to the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse’s 2026 survey, 20 states set a hard deadline for telling affected people — from 30 to 60 days — and the rest require notice “without unreasonable delay” or similar. Most also require a report to the attorney general or another state agency, some only above a threshold number of residents. Have outside counsel run the analysis; the laws differ enough that DIY is a real liability risk.

SEC Form 8-K. If you’re a public company, the SEC’s cybersecurity disclosure rule requires filing Item 1.05 of an 8-K within four business days of determining a cybersecurity incident is material. The clock starts at materiality, not discovery — but the rule says the materiality call itself must be made without unreasonable delay.

HIPAA. Healthcare entities must notify affected individuals without unreasonable delay and no later than 60 days after discovering a breach. For breaches affecting 500 or more people, HHS must be told within the same 60 days — and the media too, where more than 500 residents of a state are affected — and HHS publishes those larger breaches on its public breach portal. Smaller breaches are reported to HHS within 60 days of the end of the calendar year. The details are on HHS’s breach notification page.

Sector and contract obligations. Defense contractors handling covered defense information must report cyber incidents to the Defense Department within 72 hours of discovery under DFARS 252.204-7012. Non-bank financial businesses covered by the FTC’s Safeguards Rule — tax preparers, mortgage lenders and collection agencies among them — must tell the FTC within 30 days of discovering a breach involving 500 or more consumers. Financial services also have state rules (New York’s NYDFS is among the strictest), and many B2B contracts carry their own notice deadlines, often measured in hours or days. Get the contract list on the table now, not next week.

The pattern across our coverage — from ShinyHunters to the 68% of breaches that start with a person, not a system — is that technology rarely fails first. The first failure is almost always procedural.

Technology rarely fails first. The first failure is almost always procedural — a wire approval over text, a callback skipped, a vendor change accepted on faith.

The week after — close the door behind them

The crew that hit you has your org chart, your invoice templates, your vendor list, and now your IR habits. They will be back. A short post-incident punch list that actually moves the needle:

The companies that recover well aren’t the ones with the deepest stack; they’re the ones that already knew the phone number for their bank’s wire desk. The ones that recover badly are the ones that had to find it.

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One more thing

The incident ends with a postmortem the team actually reads and a short list of changes someone is accountable for closing by Friday. That part is unglamorous and is the only part that compounds. The rest — wires, lawyers, press — is the cost of having waited until it happened to write it down.

Frequently asked questions

What is the very first thing to do if your business sends a fraudulent wire?

Call your bank’s fraud or wire desk immediately to request a recall, and at the same time file a complaint at ic3.gov with the amount, date, receiving bank, account number and a short narrative. The FBI’s IC3 Recovery Asset Team uses those details to ask the receiving bank to freeze the account, a process called the Financial Fraud Kill Chain. In 2025 it froze $679 million of the $1.16 billion it went after, a 58% success rate. Speed is what moves those odds: FinCEN, which chases money sent abroad, says it is most likely to stop or recover a wire that’s reported within 72 hours.

Can a wire transfer to a scammer be reversed?

Sometimes, if you move fast. A wire is hard to undo once it lands, but your bank can send a recall request to the receiving bank, and if the money is still in the account it can be frozen and returned. Filing at ic3.gov adds the FBI’s weight: its Recovery Asset Team contacts receiving banks directly and froze 58% of the money it went after in 2025. Once the funds have been moved on to other accounts, the odds fall quickly.

How long do you have to report wire fraud to the FBI?

The FBI’s guidance doesn’t set a cutoff: it asks you to file at ic3.gov as soon as possible, regardless of the amount lost. But sooner matters a great deal. FinCEN says it is most likely to stop or recover money sent abroad when the wire is reported to law enforcement within 72 hours, and the FBI’s own advice for a fraudulent transfer is that time is of the essence. File the same day you find it, even if you don’t have every detail yet.

What should I do if my business email account was hacked?

Capture the evidence first: export or screenshot the account’s inbox rules and forwarding settings, because attackers use hidden rules to forward or bury payment emails. Then disable the account and revoke its active sessions — a password reset on its own doesn’t end a session the attacker already has. Remove unfamiliar MFA methods and app consents, delete the malicious rules, reset the password and re-enable the account with MFA enforced. Then phone the customers and vendors the account emailed while it was compromised.

How much does a business email compromise actually cost?

The FBI’s 2025 IC3 Annual Report logged $3.05 billion in BEC losses across 24,768 complaints — roughly $123,000 per reported incident on average, and second only to investment fraud. In 86% of the BEC transactions victims reported, the money left by wire transfer or ACH. The cheapest defense is one habit: a callback to a number already on file before any payment change.

Do I have to report a cyber incident? To whom?

It depends on the incident. Report cybercrime to ic3.gov; ransomware and significant intrusions should also go to CISA and your local FBI field office. If customer personal data was accessed, state breach notification laws apply: every state has one, 20 set a hard deadline of 30 to 60 days, and the rest require notice without unreasonable delay. Healthcare entities have HIPAA breach rules, defense contractors must report to the Defense Department within 72 hours, and public companies must file an SEC Form 8-K within four business days of determining a cyber incident is material. If you have cyber insurance, most policies require notice as soon as practicable, and insurers routinely refuse to pay costs incurred before you told them.

Should I pay the ransom?

The FBI doesn’t support paying, and paying doesn’t guarantee you get any data back — you’re relying on criminals to decrypt your files and delete what they copied. It can also break sanctions law: OFAC’s ransomware advisory applies strict liability, so you can be penalized even if you didn’t know the group was sanctioned. And it tells other attackers your business pays. The decision is yours, but make it with counsel and your insurer, and with CISA’s #StopRansomware Guide open.

What’s a vendor email compromise and why is it so dangerous?

Vendor email compromise is when a real vendor of yours has its email account taken over and the attacker sends a payment-redirect request from inside that real inbox. The signals are perfect — the right person, the right thread, the right signature block. Detection comes only from a callback to a number you already had on file, never from a number in the email itself.