Your Business Just Got Scammed. Here’s What to Do in the First Hour
Bottom line up front
If your business just sent a wire or ACH payment to a fraudster, do four things in the next hour: call your bank’s fraud line (the number on your statement, never one from the email) and ask for a recall — a SWIFT recall if it went overseas; file at ic3.gov, whatever the amount; save every email, invoice and wire confirmation; and coordinate by phone, not from a mailbox the attacker may still be reading. Money sent abroad is most likely to be stopped when it’s reported within 72 hours. Hit by ransomware instead? Disconnect the affected machines from the network, and only power them off if you can’t.
The first phone call is always the same one. A controller, voice flat, asks the bank if the $187,000 wire that left at 3:12 — the one the CFO supposedly approved over text — can come back. By the time they’re asking, the answer is often no. Sometimes it’s yes, and the difference is usually how fast they asked.
The FBI’s 2025 IC3 report attributes $3.05 billion in losses to business email compromise alone last year across 24,768 complaints — roughly $123,000 per case — and in 86% of the BEC transactions victims reported, the money left by wire transfer or ACH. Only investment fraud cost victims more. BEC doesn’t need a sophisticated target; it does best at companies with thin AP teams, no formal callback policy, and a CEO who still approves invoices over email.
This is the playbook for the moment you realize it just happened to you.
The first 60 minutes — the wire is everything
If your incident involves money already moving (BEC, vendor-email compromise, payroll diversion, fake-invoice fraud), there is only one priority and it is not technical: get the wire stopped. Everything else — legal, communications, even forensics — runs second to that call.
- Call your bank’s fraud or wire desk. Not the branch, and not a number from the email thread. Use the number on your statement or the bank’s website, or your treasury banker’s direct line. Ask them to recall the payment — a SWIFT recall if the wire went overseas — and, as the FBI’s Recovery Asset Team advises, ask what hold-harmless or indemnity letter they need from you to send it.
- File at ic3.gov in parallel. Have a second person do it while the controller is on with the bank. The FBI’s guidance is to file “regardless of the amount lost” and to include the full transaction details: amount and currency, date, your bank and account, and the receiving bank, account name and number. IC3’s Recovery Asset Team uses those details to ask the receiving bank to freeze the account — a process the FBI calls the Financial Fraud Kill Chain. For wires that went abroad, a law-enforcement complaint is also what brings in FinCEN’s Rapid Response Program; FinCEN asks victims not to contact it directly.
- Call your cyber insurer’s breach hotline. Most cyber policies require notice of an incident “as soon as practicable,” and insurers routinely refuse to pay for costs you ran up before you told them, according to broker Lockton’s cyber claims guide. Call before you hire anyone.
- Preserve evidence before you touch the inbox. Do not delete the spoof email. Do not remove the attacker’s forwarding rules until you’ve exported them. Do not reset the compromised user’s password until the forensics path is captured. The CISA-FBI #StopRansomware Guide details what to grab; the short version: full mailbox export, sign-in logs, mailbox rule history, and an image of any affected endpoint.
- Go out of band. Assume the attacker can read the compromised mailbox. Coordinate by phone, don’t reply on the hijacked thread, and don’t email the team about the incident from the system they’re in. CISA’s guidance is the same for ransomware: use out-of-band communication, such as phone calls, so attackers don’t learn they’ve been detected.
One important nuance: the fraudulent request often doesn’t come from a spoofed address at all. When a real vendor’s mailbox has been taken over, it comes from a legitimate inbox, on a legitimate thread, with a legitimate signature block — the pattern we break down in our guide to vendor email compromise and bank-detail change fraud. The fix is procedural, not technical: call back to a number you already had on file before any payment change. If your only verification channel is the email thread the attacker is on, you have no verification.
When a payment email looks even slightly off, our free email scam checker can surface the sender tells and the pressure tactic before anyone acts on it — a fast gut-check to pair with the callback, not a replacement for it.
Sources: FBI IC3 2025 Annual Report; CISA #StopRansomware Guide; SEC Form 8-K Item 1.05; HHS breach notification rule; DFARS 252.204-7012.
Who do you call first after a business scam?
In this order. The first four are for the first hour; the rest are for the same day. Each call either stops the money or protects your ability to get it back, and if you have two people, split the first two calls between them.
- Your bank’s fraud department. On a number you trust: the one on your statement or the bank’s website. Ask for a recall of the payment, a case number, and a direct contact who will tell you what the receiving bank says. Don’t take “it’s already gone” from the first person you reach; ask whether a recall request has actually been sent.
- The FBI, through ic3.gov. File even if the bank thinks the money is gone. In one case in the FBI’s 2025 report, a couple’s $449,000 closing wire was still sitting in the receiving account when IC3 asked that bank to freeze it — after the couple’s own attorneys had tried the bank and gotten nowhere. Keep the complaint number; your bank and your insurer will ask for it.
- Your cyber insurer’s breach hotline — before you hire anyone. Many policies require the insurer’s consent before you engage lawyers or forensic firms, and an insurer that didn’t agree to an off-panel vendor may not reimburse it at all, Lockton’s guide warns. Ask, too, whether the policy covers social-engineering fraud at all: not every carrier offers it, and where it’s offered the limit can be lower than the rest of the policy, brokers at Amwins note.
- The company whose identity was used. If the attacker posed as your vendor, customer or landlord, call them on a number you already had. Their mailbox may be the compromised one, and their other customers may be getting the same “new bank details” email today. The FTC’s breach-response guide makes the same point about other businesses whose accounts or data were caught up in yours.
- Your local FBI field office. IC3 is the front door, but the FBI has long told BEC victims they can also report to their local field office, and CISA’s ransomware checklist lists the field office alongside IC3 and CISA itself. If ransomware is involved or the attacker may still be inside your systems, make that call today.
- An attorney, or the breach coach the carrier assigns. Usually a privacy lawyer. They decide who you’re legally required to tell, in what order and by when, and they should see anything you put in writing to customers before it goes out.
- Your state attorney general and other regulators — if personal data was exposed. A diverted payment on its own isn’t a data breach. A compromised mailbox full of customer or employee records can be. Every state has a breach-notification law, and 36 states require a report to the attorney general or another state agency, according to a 2026 survey by the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse. Counsel runs that clock; the details are in the 72-hour section below.
Sources: FBI IC3 2025 Annual Report and Recovery Asset Team guidance; FinCEN Rapid Response Program fact sheet, April 2026; CISA ransomware checklist; Lockton cyber claims guide. Blue marks your move, red the attacker’s.
One call to refuse: anyone who contacts you offering to get the money back for a fee. Criminals follow fraud victims with fake “asset recovery” services and even fake FBI agents; the real IC3 doesn’t reach out to recover funds, as we explain in our piece on the fake FBI/IC3 recovery scam.
Copy-ready messages: your bank, the vendor, your staff
Make the calls first. Then put each one in writing, from an account you know is clean, so there’s a timestamped record. Fill in the brackets and cut anything that doesn’t apply.
To your bank (after the phone call)
Subject: Fraudulent [wire / ACH] — recall request — [Company], account ending [1234]
Following my call with [name] at [time], we are reporting a fraudulent payment and request an immediate recall.
- Amount and currency: [ ]
- Date and time sent: [ ]
- Sent from: [account name], ending [1234]
- Sent to: [beneficiary name], [receiving bank], account [number], [country]
- Reference numbers from the wire confirmation: [ ]
- IC3 complaint number: [ ]
We sent this payment on fraudulent instructions impersonating [our vendor / our CEO]. Please confirm the recall has been sent to the receiving bank, tell us what indemnification documents you need from us, and give us a case number and a direct contact. Our contact for this incident is [name, mobile].
To the vendor or customer whose name was used
Subject: Payment instructions sent in your name — please call us
On [date] we received an email from [address] asking us to [send invoice [#] to a new account / update your bank details]. We now believe it was fraudulent and have reported it to our bank and the FBI. It may mean your email account has been compromised, or that someone is imitating your domain. Until we’ve spoken by phone on [number on file], we won’t act on any payment instructions that arrive by email. Your other customers may have received the same message.
Call first. Send this only to an address you’ve confirmed on that call — never as a reply to the fraudulent thread.
To your staff (by text, phone or a channel you know is clean)
Subject: Fraud incident — read before you approve any payment
We’re dealing with a fraud involving [our email / a vendor’s email]. Until you hear otherwise from [name]:
- No payment, vendor bank-detail change or payroll change goes through without a phone call to a number already on file.
- Don’t reply to, forward or delete any email about [vendor / invoice]. Send anything related to [name].
- Don’t discuss this by email. Use [phone bridge / channel].
- If anyone calls offering to help recover the money, take their details and send them to [name].
The first 24 hours — scope it before you announce it
By hour four, you should know whether this is a one-account BEC or something deeper. The small indicators are usually the tells: a new mailbox forwarding rule pushing payment mail to RSS-Feeds or Conversation-History, a sign-in from a country your CFO has never been to, an MFA bypass via a stolen session cookie. Capture all of it. If you have managed IT or an MSSP, they get the call now; if you don’t, this is the moment to engage IR — through your cyber-insurance panel, since a firm the carrier didn’t approve may not be covered.
If the breach extends beyond an inbox — ransomware, data exfiltration, customer database access — follow CISA’s I’ve Been Hit by Ransomware checklist: isolate (disconnect, don’t shut down), preserve evidence, identify the variant if possible, and report to CISA and your local FBI field office.
Common first-day mistakes that make recovery worse
- Wiping the compromised mailbox before forensics. The mailbox rules are the evidence. Resetting first destroys the trail.
- Emailing the team about the incident — on the system the attacker still has access to. Use phones, Signal, or an out-of-band channel.
- Paying the “corrected” invoice. The attacker often emails again, mid-incident, with a new account number labeled as a fix. It’s the same scammer.
- Calling the IT vendor before the bank. Money has a clock; logs don’t.
What to do if a business email account was hacked
If the fake payment request came from inside your own email system, or the attacker clearly knew what was in your threads, treat the mailbox as compromised. The order matters here: capture what the attacker set up, then cut off their access, then clean up. Doing it the other way round deletes your evidence and can leave them a way back in.
Microsoft 365
- Capture the inbox rules and forwarding first. Microsoft’s own checklist for a compromised mailbox flags rules that forward mail to unknown addresses, rules that move messages into the Notes, Junk Email or RSS Subscriptions folders, and recently added external forwarding. An admin can list every rule, including hidden ones, with
Get-InboxRule -IncludeHidden, and mailbox-level forwarding withGet-Mailbox. Screenshot or export the output before anything is deleted. - Disable the account, then revoke its sessions. Microsoft recommends disabling the account while you investigate, then revoking all active sign-in sessions and refresh tokens (
Revoke-MgUserSignInSession). A password reset on its own doesn’t end a session the attacker already has, and app passwords aren’t revoked when you reset the password. - Check MFA methods and app consents. Remove any authentication method or device the user doesn’t recognize, and any app they didn’t knowingly grant access to the mailbox. Consent and token tricks are how attackers keep access through a password change; our explainer on device-code phishing in Microsoft 365 shows one way it happens.
- Then clean up and restore. Remove the malicious rules and forwarding, check the user hasn’t been given admin roles, reset the password, and re-enable the account with MFA enforced.
For the full Microsoft 365 eviction sequence, including rogue devices and vendor app credentials, see why a password reset isn’t enough.
If the account was lost on a fake enrollment page during a phone call, see the passkey migration scam for what else to check, including deleted security emails and apps outside single sign-on.
Google Workspace
Google’s compromised-account checklist starts with suspending the user, which also resets their sign-in cookies and OAuth tokens. From there: review the user’s sign-in events in the Admin console, reset the password, revoke OAuth tokens and app passwords, and go through the user’s Gmail filters and forwarding settings with them before you unsuspend the account. Google recommends 2-Step Verification with security keys afterwards.
Then look sideways
Check the same rules and forwarding on the mailboxes attackers like best — accounts payable, payroll and the executives whose names go on payment requests — and read the compromised account’s Sent Items for messages it sent to your customers and vendors. If the attacker sent invoices from your domain, the people who received them need a phone call too.
If an IR firm is already on the case
Let them sequence this. Some firms want a log export or a mailbox image before the account is touched, and the what not to do list in the next section still applies: isolate the account, but don’t wipe it.
Forensic preservation: what to grab before you touch anything
The most expensive IR mistake is destroying evidence by trying to clean it up before it’s been captured. Most SMBs have no in-house forensics capability — that’s fine. What matters is what you do (and don’t do) between discovery and the moment a DFIR firm picks up the case. They’ll need a clean record of three things: who got in, what they touched, what left the building. Every step before they arrive either helps or destroys that record.
Capture this, immediately, before any “cleanup”
- Disconnect, don’t shut down. Pulling a network cable or disabling Wi-Fi cuts the attacker off but preserves volatile memory — running processes, open connections, decryption keys still in RAM. Powering off wipes most of it. For VMs, suspend rather than power off; the memory state is gold.
- Export cloud audit logs now. Microsoft 365’s audit log keeps 180 days of activity on standard plans (a year for core services with Audit Premium), and an attacker with admin rights can switch auditing off. Export what’s there before anyone has the chance.
- Save the mailbox and the inbox-rules history. Especially the auto-forward rules and any rule routing payment-related mail to RSS-Feeds, Conversation-History, or Archive. Those rules are the smoking gun for BEC, and they vanish the moment a careless admin removes them.
- Pull sign-in logs. Foreign-country logins, MFA prompts answered from unrecognized devices, sessions that survived a password change. Entra ID, Okta, Duo, and Google Workspace all expose them in the admin console.
- Save spoofing artifacts in full source. Save the .eml with full headers (X-Originating-IP, Authentication-Results, Return-Path). Forwarded screenshots are not evidence; the headers are.
- Image the endpoint before anyone touches the keyboard. EDR (CrowdStrike, SentinelOne, Defender) can pull a forensic image remotely; otherwise your DFIR firm will do a write-blocked image. Don’t touch the machine until they arrive.
- Preserve a chain-of-custody log. Three columns: time, action, who did it. Sign and timestamp it. Cyber-insurance subrogation and customer litigation routinely turn on whether evidence handling can be reconstructed; even a small business needs the paper.
What not to do in the forensic window
- Do not reimage, reinstall, or factory-reset the affected machine. That destroys the timeline and frequently ends the investigation before it starts.
- Do not reset the compromised user’s password without coordinating with DFIR. Yes, it’s counterintuitive. The reset can invalidate session tokens forensics still needs and tip the attacker that the response is underway. Isolate the account first (disable, revoke tokens) and reset only when the IR lead says so.
- Do not run a full-environment AV sweep. Most consumer AV products quarantine and modify file timestamps, which mangles the timeline. Targeted EDR queries, yes; broad scans, not yet.
- Do not communicate over the compromised channel. Assume the attacker is reading internal email and Slack right now. Move incident traffic to a phone bridge, an external Signal group, or a separate, fresh Microsoft tenant.
- Do not delete the malicious email. Mark it, save the source file, leave the message in place until DFIR pulls it.
If you have cyber insurance, the policy probably names a panel of pre-approved DFIR firms; hiring someone off-panel without the carrier’s consent can leave that bill uncovered. The two calls that matter in hour two are your broker and the breach coach the carrier assigns — usually a privacy attorney who conducts everything that comes next.
The new extortion: double, triple, and pure
The ransomware story most operators carry — files get encrypted, you pay for a decryption key — is about two years out of date. Modern crews monetize the same intrusion in two or three layers, and a backups-only defense no longer covers the threat.
Double extortion — encrypt and leak — has been common for years and is now the norm: incident-response firm Coveware found data theft in 74% of the cases it worked in the second quarter of 2025. Attackers exfiltrate data days or weeks before launching the encryptor, then threaten to publish on a leak site if you don’t pay. Restoring from backups solves the encryption half and does nothing about the leak.
Triple extortion — encrypt, leak, harass — adds a third lever. Some crews email or call your customers, patients, or employees directly with their own data, demanding they pressure you to pay. Those calls can start within hours, and the social fallout outruns any plan that wasn’t pre-written.
Pure extortion — no encryption at all — is the newest and hardest model to detect. ShinyHunters, the crew behind the May 2026 Canvas breach of 8,809 institutions, built an economy on vishing into SaaS instances (Snowflake, Salesforce, support tools), exfiltrating, and threatening publication. No malware to detect, no decryptor to debate — just a phone call and a deadline.
How to handle an extortion demand
The single best decision in the first hour of an extortion event is not made by IT. It’s made by the executive who agrees, before anything else, that outside counsel and (if covered) the breach coach will lead all communications.
- Don’t reply from a corporate channel. Engagement from a company email or Slack turns extortion into a discoverable negotiation. Route everything through outside counsel and a professional ransomware-negotiation firm; cyber-insurance panels include them.
- Run the OFAC check before payment is discussed. Treasury has sanctioned ransomware operators — including a senior LockBit leader — and paying a sanctioned person is a violation regardless of business necessity. OFAC’s ransomware advisory is explicit that liability is strict: you can be penalized even if you didn’t know the recipient was sanctioned. Reporting the attack to law enforcement promptly counts in your favor.
- Verify the threat. Ask for proof of exfiltration — a specific file sample from inside your environment. A meaningful share of “we have your data” claims are recycled bluffs.
- Pre-draft the leak-site response. Once a sample goes live, the news-cycle clock is hours, not days. Have a customer notification, a regulator holding statement, and a press line ready before you know whether you’ll need them.
- Coordinate with the FBI. Reporting does not waive the option to pay later. It does unlock case-specific intelligence — including, sometimes, a way back in: after disrupting LockBit in 2024, the FBI said it held more than 7,000 of its decryption keys and asked victims to come forward.
Paying does not close the incident; it changes which kind of incident it is. You’re relying on a criminal’s promise to delete data they’ve already copied, and, as the FBI puts it, paying a ransom doesn’t guarantee you’ll get any data back.
The first 72 hours — the legal and reputational clock
Once the bleeding has stopped, the notification obligations begin. The rules are not optional and the deadlines are real.
State breach notification. All 50 states have data breach notification laws, and they don’t agree on the deadline. According to the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse’s 2026 survey, 20 states set a hard deadline for telling affected people — from 30 to 60 days — and the rest require notice “without unreasonable delay” or similar. Most also require a report to the attorney general or another state agency, some only above a threshold number of residents. Have outside counsel run the analysis; the laws differ enough that DIY is a real liability risk.
SEC Form 8-K. If you’re a public company, the SEC’s cybersecurity disclosure rule requires filing Item 1.05 of an 8-K within four business days of determining a cybersecurity incident is material. The clock starts at materiality, not discovery — but the rule says the materiality call itself must be made without unreasonable delay.
HIPAA. Healthcare entities must notify affected individuals without unreasonable delay and no later than 60 days after discovering a breach. For breaches affecting 500 or more people, HHS must be told within the same 60 days — and the media too, where more than 500 residents of a state are affected — and HHS publishes those larger breaches on its public breach portal. Smaller breaches are reported to HHS within 60 days of the end of the calendar year. The details are on HHS’s breach notification page.
Sector and contract obligations. Defense contractors handling covered defense information must report cyber incidents to the Defense Department within 72 hours of discovery under DFARS 252.204-7012. Non-bank financial businesses covered by the FTC’s Safeguards Rule — tax preparers, mortgage lenders and collection agencies among them — must tell the FTC within 30 days of discovering a breach involving 500 or more consumers. Financial services also have state rules (New York’s NYDFS is among the strictest), and many B2B contracts carry their own notice deadlines, often measured in hours or days. Get the contract list on the table now, not next week.
The pattern across our coverage — from ShinyHunters to the 68% of breaches that start with a person, not a system — is that technology rarely fails first. The first failure is almost always procedural.
The week after — close the door behind them
The crew that hit you has your org chart, your invoice templates, your vendor list, and now your IR habits. They will be back. A short post-incident punch list that actually moves the needle:
- Force a password and session reset for every user in the affected tenant, not just the compromised one. Revoke all OAuth tokens.
- Make MFA conditional and FIDO2-based for finance, executives, and IT admins. SMS and push notifications keep getting defeated by adversary-in-the-middle kits.
- Write the callback policy down. “Any payment change, any vendor banking detail change, any executive request for a wire — verified by phone to a number on file, no exceptions.” Put it on the AP team’s wall.
- Run a real tabletop exercise within 30 days. Not a checklist review — an actual run-through with the controller, IT, legal, and a comms lead in the room.
- Inventory remote-access tools. List every remote-support program on every machine and remove anything your IT provider didn’t install. Attackers increasingly come back through a legitimate tool they left behind; our guide to rogue RMM has the checklist.
- Schedule the phishing simulations. Phishing-resistance is a perishable skill; one campaign doesn’t hold. Our 30-day SMB rollout plan is the version of this we’ve seen actually work.
The companies that recover well aren’t the ones with the deepest stack; they’re the ones that already knew the phone number for their bank’s wire desk. The ones that recover badly are the ones that had to find it.
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Start free →One more thing
The incident ends with a postmortem the team actually reads and a short list of changes someone is accountable for closing by Friday. That part is unglamorous and is the only part that compounds. The rest — wires, lawyers, press — is the cost of having waited until it happened to write it down.